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Denying Sovereignty: The Louisiana Supreme Court's
Rejection of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine
INTRODUCTION
In its recent decision in Meyer & Associates, Inc. v. Coushatta
Tribe ofLouisiana, the Louisiana Supreme Court declined to require
the application of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine (the "Doctrine") in
Louisiana state district courts.' The Doctrine is a federal
jurisprudential rule that applies when a tribal court has a claim of
jurisdiction over a dispute. It requires federal courts to abstain from
hearing the case until the tribal court has determined whether it can
properly retain jurisdiction over the matter. 3 The effect of this ruling
by the Louisiana Supreme Court is that tribal courts will be denied
the ability, in many instances, to determine questions related to
tribal sovereign immunity. The United States Supreme Court has not
yet had the occasion to determine whether the Doctrine is required
of state courts, and several states have reached different conclusions
as to whether their courts will be required to apply the Doctrine.4
Upon further examination of federal common law, as well as strong
prudential considerations in favor of the Doctrine's application, it
becomes apparent that the Louisiana Supreme Court erred in
declining to apply the Doctrine to Louisiana state district courts.
This Note will analyze the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision
not to follow the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine in Meyer. The first part
of this Note will recount the history of the Tribal Exhaustion
Doctrine and its status in both federal and state courts. The second
part will discuss the decision in Meyer and will summarize the
analysis of both the majority and dissenting opinions. The third part
will discuss the Louisiana Supreme Court's duty, under the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, to apply the Doctrine to
Louisiana courts.5 The fourth part will argue that, in addition to the
Louisiana Supreme Court's obligation under the Supremacy Clause,
a careful consideration of prudential factors, as well as state and
federal policies in favor of tribal sovereignty and self-determination,
should have led the court to require that lower Louisiana state courts
apply the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine to disputes like Meyer.
Copyright 2011, by CAREY AUSTIN HOLLIDAY.
1. Meyer & Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 992 So. 2d 446, 452
(La. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1908 (2009).
2. Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
856 (1985).
3. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987).
4. See discussion infra Part I.B.
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
0LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
I. THE TRIBAL EXHAUSTION DocTRINE
A. The Doctrine in General
Native American tribes are characterized by the United States
Supreme Court as being "domestic dependent nations."6 They are
"distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive."7 In recognition of its
responsibility to these domestic dependent nations, Congress has
made efforts to ensure that tribal sovereignty is both maintained
and respected. Tribal courts play an important role in sustaining
tribal sovereignty, and the federal government took steps to ensure
their development.9 Native American tribes retain the ability to
govern their lands and tribe members, provided that there is no
federal statute or treaty restricting the exercise of that authority.10
Necessarily, then, Native American tribes and their courts "occupy
a unique status under our law."" Because of this unique position,
tribes often find themselves caught in a power struggle between
tribal, federal, and state governments. 12
In response to problems that the tribes' unique legal status
poses, federal courts inventively created a set of jurisdictional rules
to apply in disputes involving both members and non-members of
a tribe. One such rule is the "Tribal Exhaustion" or the
"Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies" Doctrine, which was first
announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in National Farmers Union
v. Crow Tribe ofIndians.' The Doctrine requires that, in situations
where a tribal court has a claim of jurisdiction that has been
challenged, the tribal court will be the first institution with the
opportunity to evaluate the basis upon which the challenge has
been made. 14 Thus, the Doctrine requires that federal courts stay
6. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
7. Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).
8. See Iowa, 480 U.S. at 14.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
851 (1985).
12. Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The
Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part I ofl), 46 AM. J. COMP.
L. 287,293 (1998).
13. 471 U.S. 845.
14. See id. at 856; see also Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian
Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[W]hen a colorable
claim of tribal court jurisdiction has been asserted, a federal court may (and
ordinarily should) give the tribal court precedence and afford it a full and fair
opportunity to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction . . . .").
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their proceedings until the tribal courts initially resolve questions
of jurisdiction.
In National, as well as its companion case, Iowa Mutual
Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,5 the U.S. Supreme Court characterized
the Doctrine as one encompassing the federal government's desire
to support tribal self-government by recognizing that a federal
court's exercise of jurisdiction over disputes involving a tribe or its
members weakens the authority of tribal courts.' 6 The Doctrine
promotes the orderly administration of justice because it protects
against "procedural nightmares" 7 and allows other courts to
benefit from tribal courts' expertise in the event that a party
appeals the decision.
The U.S. Supreme Court has gone as far as to say that the
application of the Doctrine is "required" as a matter of comity.19
As defined previously by the Court, comity "is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws." 20 Given this language, it appears that, when Exhaustion
is applicable, the Court's policy is to treat tribes as if they are
sovereign nations.
Nonetheless, the Doctrine's application is limited. Specifically,
in National, the Court provided three potential scenarios in which
exhaustion would not be required: where the assertion of
jurisdiction by the tribal court has been made in bad faith or was
motivated out of a desire to harass a party; where such an assertion
would violate express jurisdictional provisions; or where the
application would result in a party being denied an opportunity to
challenge the jurisdictional decision.2' If none of these exceptions
are implicated, federal courts must adhere to the Doctrine in civil
cases.
This does not, of course, mean that a litigant whose state court
claim has been removed to the tribal court for a determination of
jurisdiction is without recourse. Once the tribal court determines
whether it has jurisdiction, the litigant will be able to seek review
in the federal courts. This federal court review will likely come
15. 480 U.S. 9.
16. Id. at 18.
17. National, 471 U.S. at 856-57.
18. Id. at 857.
19. Iowa, 480 U.S. at 16 n.8.
20. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
21. National, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21.
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after a tribal appeals court has upheld a lower tribal court's
decision on the question of jurisdiction. 22
B. The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine in State Courts
Although there is no question that the Tribal Exhaustion
Doctrine applies to federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
explicitly stated whether the Doctrine equally applies to state
23courts. As a result, states may reach different conclusions on the
matter. The Connecticut Supreme Court in Drumm v. Brown held
that its state courts are bound by the Doctrine.25 In Drumm, the
Connecticut Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility that the
Doctrine is actually an interstitial rule of federal common law26
that likely binds state courts under the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. 27 Regardless of this possibility, the Connecticut
Supreme Court ultimately held that policy considerations
compelled them to require the Doctrine's application.28 On a
similar note, the Wisconsin 29 and New York30 high courts
recognize the Doctrine, while courts in Arizona,3' Minnesota,32
22. Iowa, 480 U.S. at 19.
23. Meyer & Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 992 So. 2d 446, 450
(La. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1908 (2009).
24. Of course, guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court may not be
necessary. See discussion infra Part III.
25. 716 A.2d 50 (Conn. 1998).
26. Interstitial rules are gap-filling mechanisms created by federal courts.
They have the same force and effect as federal statutes and are binding under the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See discussion infra Part III.A.
27. Drumm, 716 A.2d at 62-63.
28. Id. at 63.
29. See generally Bryan Cahill, Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior
Tribe of Chippewa Indians: Bringing the Federal Exhaustion Rule of Tribal
Remedies Home to Wisconsin Courts, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 1291.
30. Seneca v. Seneca, 741 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). In
Seneca, the New York appellate court declined to apply the Doctrine because
there was not a concurrent action pending in tribal court. The court did indicate,
however, that were there a similar action pending, they may be required to apply
the Doctrine as a matter of federal common law, as discussed in Drumm. See
supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
31. Astorga v. Wing, 118 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). The
Arizona Supreme Court made this determination because of the fact that federal
courts have the ability to review these determinations, whereas state courts do not.
32. Gayle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 292 (Minn. 1996). The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a state court's determination of whether
tribal sovereign immunity had been waived would not act as an infringement on
tribal sovereign immunity.
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Oklahoma, 33 and Washington34 do not require application of the
Doctrine in their courts.
In summary, the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine requires that a
tribal court have the first chance to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over a case. 35 Although the Doctrine unquestionably
applies to federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court has not had
occasion to apply this Doctrine to state courts. 36 Due to this lack of
guidance, many states have reached opposing conclusions on the
question of whether they are required to apply the Doctrine. It was
this question, in particular, that the Louisiana Supreme Court faced
in Meyer.
II. MEYER & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. COUSHATA TRIBE OF LOUISIANA:
THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
In December 2001, the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana (the
"Tribe") entered into a contract with Meyer and Associates, Inc.
for general engineering and construction services. 37 The contract
contained a clause statinpg that it would be governed by the laws of
the State of Louisiana.3 It further provided that, in the event of a
dispute between the parties, the dispute would be settled by
binding arbitration according to the American Arbitration
Association. 39
The two parties then decided that they would enter into a joint
venture to develop a power plant on reservation property.40 The
tribal council issued a resolution authorizing the Chairman of the
Tribe, Lovelin Poncho, to negotiate and execute agreements on
behalf of the Tribe that would be necessary to the furtherance of
the joint venture.41 Pursuant to this grant, Chairman Poncho
entered into a Supplemental Agreement with Meyer on behalf of
the Tribe.42 The Supplemental Agreement contained a provision
33. Michael Minnis & Assocs., P.C. v. Kaw Nation, 90 P.3d 1009, 1014
(Okla. Civ. App. 2003). An Oklahoma appellate court determined that the Tribe
had waived its sovereign immunity and that, much like in Meyer, exhaustion did
not apply.
34. Maxa v. Yakima Petroleum, Inc., 924 P.2d 372 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
35. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
856 (1985).
36. Meyer & Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 992 So. 2d 446, 450
(La. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1908 (2009).
37. Id. at 448.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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stating that any disputes between the parties would be subject to
courts "in the Parish of Allen, or any other Parish mutually agreed
to" and that the Tribe had "specifically waive[d] any rights, claims
or defenses to sovereign immunity it may have."43 This agreement
and purported waiver of soverejn immunity were never directly
authorized by the tribal council. Additionally, the Tribe executed
several memorandums of understanding with various other parties
to the venture, each containing a similar forum selection clause.45
Ultimately, a dispute arose, and on April 21, 2006, the Tribe
filed suit in tribal court against Meyer for damages related to the
various contracts.46 Subsequently, on June 9 2006, Meyer filed
suit in state district court against the Tribe.41 The Tribe filed an
exception for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the
Tribe's sovereign immunity, which the state district court denied.
On August 8, 2006, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
applied the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine and stayed the proceedings
pending a resolution of the jurisdictional question in the tribal
court.4 The third circuit's opinion effectively reversed the trial
court's decision to deny the exception.5 0 Meyer applied for
certiorari, which the Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently
granted.
The Louisiana Supreme Court dealt with two issues in the case.
The first was largely procedural, where the court sought to
determine whether the state district court should have applied the
Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies Doctrine, which would provide the
tribal court with the opportunity to determine whether the Tribe
had waived its sovereign immunity.5 The second issue was
substantive in nature, as the court sought to determine whether the
Tribe had waived its sovereign immunity, thereby subjecting itself
to the jurisdiction of the state district court.52
43. Id.
44. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Meyer, 992 So. 2d 446 (No. 08-985),
2009 WL 273312.
45. Meyer, 992 So. 2d at 448.
46. Id. at 448-49.
47. Id. at 449.
48. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 44.
49. Meyer, 992 So. 2d at 449.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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A. The Louisiana Supreme Court's Discussion of the Doctrine and
Its Application
The majority opinion recognized the existence of the Tribal
Exhaustion Doctrine and stated that its purpose is "to allow self-
government and self-determination by [Native American] tribes of
which tribal courts play an important role." 53 The court also stated
that the rule is merely a prudential one that is applied only as a
matter of comity. 54 The majority argued, however, that it was not
required to follow the Doctrine because the U.S. Supreme Court
has never explicitly required that state courts apply the Doctrine.5 5
It then disapprovingly characterized the effects of the Doctrine,
essentially stating that the Doctrine requires a court with
jurisdiction to turn over the case to a court that may or may not
have jurisdiction in order to answer that very question.5 The
majority, asserting that "state courts are the arbiters of their own
jurisdiction," held that the district court was correct in entertaining
the issue of whether it retained subject matter jurisdiction.5 7
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the majority cited to
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. 8
for the rule that Native American tribes are only subject to suit in
nontribal courts where Congress has specifically authorized the
suit or if the tribe has waived its immunity.5 9 In order to decide
whether the Tribe had waived its sovereign immunity, the majority
took it upon itself to interpret section 1.1.05 of the Coushatta
Tribal Code to determine whether the tribal council's grant of
authority to Chairman Poncho gave him the authority to waive the
Tribe's immunity.60 The majority claimed that the language of
section 1.1.05 was clear and should be given its plain meaning and
concluded that, under Coushatta's tribal law, Chairman Poncho
waived the Tribe's sovereign immunity. 6 1 Therefore, the court
held, the state district court correctly denied the Tribe's exception
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Tribe was subject to
the jurisdiction of the Louisiana state courts.6 2
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 450.
56. Id.
57. Id
58. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
59. Id. at 754.
60. Meyer, 992 So. 2d at 450-51.
61. Id. at 451.
62. Id at 451-52.
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B. Justice Kimball's Dissent
Justice Kimball argued that the tribal court should have been
allowed to determine its own jurisdiction by answering the
question of whether the Tribe had waived its sovereign
immunity. 63 To illustrate the point that the tribal court had a
colorable claim of jurisdiction, Justice Kimball cited Montana v.
United States.64 In Montana, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
when non-members enter into consensual, commercial
relationships with Native American Tribes, the Tribes retain the
authority to govern the actions of these non-members.65 She then
applied the three limitations on the Doctrine's application found in
National66 and concluded that they were not implicated in this
case.67 Ultimately, Justice Kimball argued that, because the tribal
court could have had jurisdiction and because none of the National
limitations applied, the Tribal court was the proper venue for the
preliminary qgestion of whether the tribal court's jurisdiction had
been waived.
Justice Kimball countered the majority's assertion that the
Doctrine does not apply because it is merely "an optional matter of
comity."69 She noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has never stated
that the Doctrine is discretionary and that the existence of three
exceptions to the Doctrine, as well as the Court's refusal to expand
63. Id. at 453 (Kimball, J., dissenting).
64. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
65. Id. at 565-66; see Meyer, 992 So. 2d at 455 (Kimball, J., dissenting).
66. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
67. Meyer, 992 So. 2d at 456-57 (Kimball, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 456.
69. Id. at 457. Chief Justice Calogero concurred with the majority's
decision. Id. at 452 (Calogero, C.J., concurring). He argued that, because the
U.S. Supreme Court did not mention the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine in its
decision in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523
U.S. 751 (1998)-a case involving a tribal court being sued in state court-the
Court has implicitly indicated that the doctrine does not apply to state courts.
Meyer, 992 So. 2d at 452 (Calogero, C.J., concurring). However, it should be
noted that the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine was not an issue before the Court in
Kiowa. No mention of the Doctrine was made in the petition for certiorari,
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (No. 96-1037), 1996 WL
33414086; the brief in opposition, Respondent's Brief in Opposition, Kiowa,
523 U.S. 751 (No. 96-1037), 1997 WL 33484618; or in either party's appellate
brief, Brief for Petitioner, Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (No. 96-1037), 1997 WL
523863; Brief for Respondent, Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (No. 96-1037), 1997 WL
597299; Reply Brief for Petitioner, Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (No. 96-1037), 1997
WL 668161. Additionally, neither party mentioned the Doctrine in oral
argument. Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751 (No. 96-1037),
1998 WL 15116. Thus, neither party attempted to litigate the issue on those
grounds.
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those exceptions, indicates its application is mandatory.' Citing
the rationale used by the Supreme Court in National and Iowa
where the Doctrine was first created,72 she argued that, by taking it
upon itself to interpret a provision of tribal law, the state court
unjustifiably interfered with the tribal court's ability to interpret its
own Tribal Code. 73
Justice Kimball went on to discuss the fact that the Connecticut
Supreme Court, in Drumm,74 had already concluded that the
Doctrine applies in Connecticut state courts. 5 Drumm reasoned
that the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine is an interstitial rule and that,
as part of federal common law, state courts must abide by the
Doctrine's requirements.7 6 Although she raised this as a possibility,
Justice Kimball ultimately rested her argument on the prudential
concerns in favor of tribal sovereignty and that self-determination
should compel the court to adopt the Doctrine. She concluded
that the majority was incorrect in deciding not to apply the
Doctrine.
III. THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT WAS REQUIRED TO APPLY
THE TRIBAL EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet had the occasion to
explicitly consider whether state courts are required to apply the
Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine. The majority in Meyer cited this lack
of direct input as a reason for not requiring the Doctrine in
Louisiana state courts. 79 However, the court in Meyer erred by
failing to consider whether the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine is an
interstitial rule of federal common law that courts are required,
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, to follow.
70. In Iowa, the Court refused to expand the limitations on the Doctrine that
were set out in National. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987)
("The alleged incompetence of tribal courts is not among the exceptions to the
exhaustion requirement established in [National], and would be contrary to the
congressional policy promoting the development of tribal courts." (footnote and
citation omitted)).
71. Meyer, 992 So. 2d at 458 (Kimball, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 459-60.
73. Id at 461.
74. Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 63 (Conn. 1998).
75. Meyer, 992 So. 2d at 461 (Kimball, J., dissenting) (citing Drumm, 716
A.2d at 50).
76. Id. (citing Drumm, 716 A.2d at 62-63).
77. Id. at 461-62.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 450.
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A. Federal Common Law and Interstitial Rules: A Primer
The Supremacy Clause, found in Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution, provides that "the Laws of the United States ... shall
be the Supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby."80 State courts are bound to adhere to
federal law where it exists. What the majority in Meyer failed to
recognize was that "federal law" includes more than just statutes
passed by Congress and the rules and regulations enacted by
federal administrative agencies. Federal law also includes federal
common law, which federal courts may create in certain
circumstances. 1 This body of federal common law is, like all other
sources of federal law, binding upon the states via the Supremacy
Clause.82
Federal common law is the body of judge-made law that
previously had been applied in diversity of citizenship cases. As
Justice Brandeis emphatically stated in his majority opinion in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, there is "no federal general common
law."84 The result in Erie was such that federal courts are required
to employ the substantive law of the state in which the court sits.85
However, the Erie rule is not absolute. Although there is no federal
"general" common law, federal common law does exist. This is
illustrated by Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., another opinion authored by Justice Brandeis, in which the
Court applied federal common law to decide a dispute between two
states regarding water rights.86
Federal common law may be created through the use of
interstitial rules. Federal courts use interstitial rules to fill in gaps
that exist in bodies of federal legislation.8 7 The need to create these
rules flows from "the inevitable incompleteness presented by the
80. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
81. Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 405 (1964). In a seminal work discussing the
effects of the Erie doctrine, Judge Friendly discusses the fact that, although Erie
shut the door on general federal common law, the possibility for specialized
federal common law still exists.
82. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 HARV. L. REv. 881, 897 (1986).
83. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 313 (9th ed. 2009).
84. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938).
85. Id. at 78.
86. 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
87. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4516 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Update).
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enactment of complex and comprehensive legislation."88 In order
to properly enforce the statutory schemes enacted by Congress,
federal courts are required to fill the gaps that Congress may have
overlooked. 89 The existence of this authority comes from a
practical recognition that there is futility in attempting to pass
legislation that will wholly and completely govern an area of the
law. 90
Federal courts are apt to create interstitial rules in areas that are
of particular interest to the federal government.9 1 Whether the
courts actually have authority to create these rules remains a
question of federal congressional intent.92 Some authorities
contend that the requisite intent may be gleaned from an implicit
delegation by Congress of lawmaking authority to federal courts.9 3
In addition to the need for Congressional intent, there must also be
an actual gap in which Congress has failed to legislate. 94 It is only
then that federal courts may fill the gap according to their own
standards.9 5 In sum, a court has the ability to create these
interstitial rules in heavily federalized areas of the law, where
Congress has intended to grant lawmaking authority to federal
courts and an actual gap in legislation exists.
B. The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine as an Interstitial Rule
In its decision in Drumm, the Connecticut Supreme Court
discussed the possibility that the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine is an
interstitial rule and that state courts are bound to follow it.96 Justice
Kimball's dissent in Meyer also discussed this possibility. But
neither Justice Kimball nor the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Drumm rested its analysis on this, as both ultimately felt that mere
prudential concerns were strong enough to compel the Doctrine's
application.9 7 Resting on prudential concerns is simply not
necessary. The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine is an interstitial rule of
federal common law. As an interstitial rule of federal common law,
88. Coop. Benefit Adm'rs, Inc. v. Ogden, 265 F. Supp. 2d 662, 671 (M.D.
La. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 367 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2003).
89. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973).
90. D'Oench, Dume & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
91. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004).
92. 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 87, § 4516.
93. Id.
94. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
95. Id.
96. Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 63 (Conn. 1998).
97. Id.; Meyer & Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 992 So. 2d 446,
461 (La. 2008) (Kimball, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1908 (2009).
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the Doctrine, and its application in state courts, is mandated by the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The first essential element for the creation and application of
these interstitial rules is that there be a heavily federalized area that
is of particular interest to the federal government.9 8 In matters
concerning Native Americans, there is a considerable amount of
federal authority over the tribes.99 The federal government has
hardly under-utilized this grant of authority, and many aspects of
Native American life are governed by federal legislation. 00 As
discussed in both National and Iowa, there is a strong interest in
the promotion of tribal sovereignty and self-determination. 0 1
Therefore, it would appear that the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, as
a vehicle for the promotion of tribal sovereignty and self-
determination, fits within this statutory scheme and acts to promote
Congress's policies regarding Native Americans.
There must also be an intent, implied or otherwise, by
Congress to delegate lawmaking authority respecting Native
Americans to federal courts.102 This intent is evidenced by the fact
that the U.S. Supreme Court has already applied federal common
law to decisions involving Native Americans. In Oneida County v.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that several of the Court's past decisions have used federal
common law to uphold Native Americans' indigenous land
98. See discussion supra Part III.A.
99. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978) ("Congress has
plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters, including their
form of government.").
100. Some examples of federal legislation include: The Adult Indian
Vocational Training Act, 25 U.S.C. § 309 (2006); The Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458
(2006 & Supp. 2009); The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1341 (2006); The Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1544
(2006); The Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C §§ 1601-1683
(2006 & Supp. 2009); The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1963 (2006); The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act (NAGPRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006); The American Indian
Agricultural Resource Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3746 (2006); The
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
101. Richard M. Nixon, Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting Recommendations for Indian Policy (July 8, 1970), reprinted in
DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES F. WiLKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 151-53 (2d ed. 1986). This is a printed reproduction of
President Nixon's message to Congress that served as a "catalyst" for federal
regulations regarding Native Americans. In the letter, President Nixon urged that
Congress "make it clear that the Indians can become Independent of Federal
control without being cut off from Federal concern and Federal support." Id.
102. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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rights. o0 Congress has not sought to limit this judicially created
right through statute and, therefore, this can be taken as an implicit
acceptance of the Court's actions. On a similar note, the Tribal
Exhaustion Doctrine has remained undisturbed by federal legislation
for over 20 years. This, too, may serve as an implicit approval of the
Court's decision and further acceptance of the Court's ability to
create interstitial rules as part of federal common law.
Lastly, for the Doctrine to function as an interstitial rule, there
must also be an actual gap in which Congress has failed to
legislate. Currently, there is no federal statute that explicitly
governs how courts are to proceed when tribal courts and state or
federal district courts have colorable claims of jurisdiction over a
dispute. Given the sheer number of federal statutes passed by
Congress that govern the lives of Native Americans,104 and the fact
that Congress has not provided explicit guidance on these
jurisdictional questions, it is clear that there is a gap that the
Doctrine can easily fill. The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, therefore,
meets all of the requirements for being an interstitial rule as part of
federal common law. This is because there is a heavily federalized
area of the law, implicit intent by the U.S. Congress to delegate
this law making authority to federal courts, and a gap that exists
between statutes governing Native Americans.
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly state that it was
creating an interstitial rule, the language used in National and Iowa
indicates a desire to apply the Doctrine in all situations, save for a
few exceptions.1 05 In National, the Court laid out several factors
that must be weighed before a determination of tribal court
jurisdiction can be madel 06 and further stated that tribal courts
should be given the first opportunity to examine them. 0 7 On this
same note, in Iowa, the Court also stated that the promotion of
tribal self-government requires that tribal courts have the first
103. Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226, 234-
35 (1985).
104. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
106. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
855-56 (1985) ("[T]he answer to the question whether a tribal court has the
power to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-Indians in a case of
this kind is not automatically foreclosed .... Rather, the existence and extent of
a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal
sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or
diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch
policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial
decisions. We believe that examination should be conducted in the first instance
in the [t]ribal [c]ourt itself." (footnote omitted)).
107. Id. at 856.
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opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for a challenge
to tribal court jurisdiction. os And, as noted by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in Drumm, the Court's statement in Iowa that
"[a]djudication of such matters by any nontribal court ... infringes
upon tribal lawmaking authority" is indicative of a desire for the
rule to apply beyond the bounds of the federal court system.109 The
U.S Supreme Court further held that the adjudication of questions
of jurisdiction by nontribal courts would be an infringement upon
tribal authority because tribal courts are the most qualified to
interpret tribal law."10 The Court has even indicated that the
Doctrine's application is "required" as a matter of comity."' In its
only mention of state court authority in either National or Iowa, the
Court stated that "[t]he federal policy favoring tribal self-
government operates even in areas where state control has not been
affirmatively pre-empted by federal statute."ll2 These
considerations, coupled with the fact that the Doctrine clearly
meets the requirements for being an interstitial rule, show that the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Meyer is erroneous and is
in violation of the court's obligations under the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.
IV. PRUDENTIAL CONCERNS IN FAVOR OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
AND SELF-DETERMINATION SHOULD HAVE PERSUADED THE
LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT TO ADOPT THE TRIBAL ExiAuSTION
DOCTRINE IN LOUISIANA'S STATE COURTS
In its decision in Meyer, the Louisiana Supreme Court declined
to apply the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine in Louisiana's district
courts because it concluded that the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine is
a prudential rule and, thus, discretionary." 3 For the reasons set
forth above, this was erroneous. Even if the Doctrine were
discretionary, however, consideration of prudential factors
108. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
109. Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 63 (Conn. 1998) (emphasis added)
(quoting Iowa, 480 U.S. at 16).
110. Iowa, 480 U.S. at 16.
111. Id. at 16 n.8.
112. Id. at 14.
113. Meyer & Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 992 So. 2d 446, 449
(La. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1908 (2009). In its petition in opposition of
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, Meyer and Associates, Inc. argued that the
court's decision in Meyer did not definitively foreclose the Doctrine's
application in state court. Brief in Opposition, Meyer, 992 So. 2d 446 (No. 08-
985), 2009 WL 599619. Given the court's characterization of the Doctrine's
effects, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, it appears unlikely that a
district court in Louisiana would apply the Doctrine from this point onward.
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weighing in favor of the Doctrine's application should have
compelled the Louisiana Supreme Court to reach a different
conclusion.
A. Allowing Tribal Courts to Apply Their Own Law Promotes the
Core Federal Goals of Tribal Sovereignty and Self-Determination
Native American tribes are immune from suit in state courts
unless they have waived their sovereign immunity.114 Therefore,
the ultimate question ofjurisdiction in cases such as Meyer rests on
a determination of whether the Tribe has waived its sovereign
immunity. The determination of tribal sovereignty will, in most
cases, be a question of tribal law. As stated in Iowa, "[p]romotion
of tribal self-government . . . require[s] that the tribal court have
'the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the
challenge' [of] jurisdiction."" 5 Thus, Native American tribal
courts should be given the opportunity to determine their own
jurisdiction, and not, as the Louisiana Supreme Court held in
Meyer,"l 6 nontribal courts.
One of the most compelling reasons why a nontribal court
should not apply and interpret tribal law is, quite simply, because
tribal law is different.'"7 This was apparently on the minds of the
Supreme Court justices in National; the Court stated that the
Doctrine "will also provide other courts with the benefit of their
expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review." 5 8
This is because of the simple fact that the application of tribal law
is not well-suited to the adjudicatory system practiced in state and
federal courts." 9
114. See generally Bonnette v. Tunica-Biloxi Indians, 873 So. 2d I (La. Ct.
App. 3d 2003).
115. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) (quoting Nat'1
Farmers Union Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985)).
116. Meyer, 992 So. 2d at 450-52. Here, the court interpreted section 1.1.05
of the Coushatta Tribal Code and determined that, under the Tribe's law, a
waiver of sovereign immunity had occurred.
117. See Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law:
The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part II of II), 46 Am. J.
COMP. L. 509, 562 (1998).
118. National, 471 U.S. at 857.
119. John J. Harte, Validity of a State Court's Exercise of Concurrent
Jurisdiction over Civil Actions Arising in Indian Country: Application of the
Indian Abstention Doctrine in State Court, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 63, 80
(1997).
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1. Native American Culture and Its Influence on Native
American Law
Law is a product of the cultural processes of a people and is
part of their culture.120 Furthermore, the processes relating to the
application of law reflect the culture in which those processes
exist. 12 1 Accordingly, Native American culture has influenced
Native American laws, and for a nontribal court to interpret tribal
law in order to determine a question of jurisdiction is an affront to
tribal sovereignty.122
Some commentators have denied that Native American culture
has influenced tribal law because many tribal codes are modified
versions of model codes promulgated by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs.123 However, this certainly does not foreclose the ability of
Native American culture to have an effect on the law and its
application. One scholar observed that "custom is the
'underground law' of the [tribal] courts, in the sense that it affects
many decisions without being explicitly recognized or
systematized in writing." 24 Further, tribal courts do allow social
norms to influence their decision-making process, and those norms
are reflected in a body of Native American common law.125
An examination of Cherokee tribal courts illustrates the effect
that culture has on tribal law.126 Although codes bearing
resemblance to those found in typical American courts had been
introduced, "[t]raditional Cherokee thought on laws and legal
120. See Alan Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture,
131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1152 (1983); see also ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &
JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 2 (2000) ("But life in the law is not lived
in a vacuum. It is part of a pervasive world of culture. If law is to work for the
people in a society, it must be (and must be seen to be) an extension or reflection
of their culture.").
121. See OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL 2 (2005).
122. See generally Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 12.
123. See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS AND THE
COST OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 17 (1978).
124. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 117, at 563; see also Frank
Pommersheim & Sherman Marshall, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An
Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 411, 429-34.
125. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 12, at 294. Cooter interviewed several
tribal court judges and ultimately came to the conclusion that those persons
enforcing tribal law refine precedent and also draw upon tribal custom to assist
in the decision making process.
126. Although, obviously, the Cherokee are a different tribe from the
Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana, it is important to illustrate the fact that tribal
courts can be-and in several instances are-influenced by their particular
tribe's culture.
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institutions survived long after the adoption of written codes."l 27
Most of this came from the fact that written tribal laws were
incomplete and thus needed to be supplemented.128 The gaps that
remained were sometimes filled with tribal customs.' 29 In many
respects, the ancient Cherokee manner of enforcing laws lived on
past Anglo-American adaptations to their legal system.130 Given that
tribal culture can-and sometimes does-influence tribal decision
making, a nontribal court is not qualified to apply tribal law.
Yet in Meyer, the Louisiana Supreme Court took it upon itself
to interpret a provision of the Coushatta Tribal Code.' 3 1
Specifically, the court applied the following language from section
1.1.05 of the Coushatta Tribal Code:
The Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana, as a sovereign
government, is absolutely immune from suit, and its Tribal
Counsel, judges, Appellate Judges, ad-hoc Judges, officers,
agents, and employees shall be immune from any civil or
criminal liability arising or alleged to arise from their
performance or non-performance of their official duties.
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to constitute a waiver
of the sovereign immunity of the Coushatta Tribe of
Louisiana except as expressly provided herein or as
specifically waived by a resolution or ordinance agroved
by the Tribal Counsel specifically referring to such.
The majority interpreted the "nothing in this Code" language
literally to mean only that the Code itself cannot waive tribal
immunity.133 It then went on to draw the negative inference that a
waiver outside of the confines of the Code, such as the Tribal
Resolution given to Chairman Poncho, could potentially waive the
tribe's sovereignty. 134 The Meyer court applied this interpretation
despite the fact that the tribal council had never explicitly
authorized the waiver of immunity but rather had generally granted
127. RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM
CLAN TO COURT 183 (1975).
128. Id. at 187-88.
129. Id. at 187.
130. Id. at 188.
131. Meyer & Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 992 So. 2d 446, 450-
51 (La. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1908 (2009).
132. Id. at 450-51 (emphasis added) (citing title 1, section 1.1.05 of the
Coushatta Tribal Code).
133. Id. at 451 ("[The words] 'nothing in this Code' mak[e] clear that the
codal article applies only to the language of the Code, and not to waivers
extraneous to the Code.").
134. Id.
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negotiating authority to Chairman Poncho.'3 5 The court also failed
to address Coushatta's reliance on tribal court jurisprudence, which
interprets this provision of the Coushatta Tribal Code differently
136.than the court did in Meyer. As suggested by the Tribe, tribal
court jurisprudence indicates that a waiver of the sort alleged b
the plaintiff may not have been possible under tribal law.'
Ultimately, the fact that there is a possibility that the tribal court
would have reached a different conclusion serves as a further
indication that the tribal court should have had the first opportunity
to decide whether tribal sovereign immunity had been waived.
B. The Doctrine's Application Is Similar to, and Should Be Treated
like, the Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies Doctrine
The Louisiana Supreme Court declined to apply the Tribal
Exhaustion Doctrine because it felt the prudential considerations
underlying the Doctrine's creation allowed its application to be
discretionary. 1 However, Louisiana courts already apply a similar
Doctrine, the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine. 3 9
These doctrines are strikingly analogous, and a useful parallel may
be drawn between them. Because of this similarity, the Tribal
Exhaustion Doctrine and its application should also be required of
Louisiana courts in a manner that resembles the application of the
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine.
The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine requires
that all available avenues of administrative relief be exhausted
before a party is able to obtain judicial review of an action of an
administrative agency.14 0 If a person feels as though administrative
actions may cause him or her future harm, district courts will not
provide relief until all legal remedies that are available within the
agency have been exhausted.141 The goal of the Doctrine of
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is to avoid premature
claims and also to give reviewing courts the benefit of the agency's
135. Id. at 448.
136. The Tribe asserted that, in Celestine v. Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana,
the tribal court held that, absent proper authorization, a waiver could not be
effectuated unless it is authorized directly by the Tribal Council. Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 44.
13 7. Id.
138. Meyer, 992 So. 2d at 451.
139. Jackson v. Mayo, 975 So. 2d 815 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2008) ("A party must
generally exhaust his administrative remedy before he can seek relief by suit.").
140. See William Funk, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies-New
Dimensions Since Darby, 18 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 1 (2000).
141. STEPHEN J. CANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 116-17 (2d ed. 1998).
[Vol. 711356
expertise, the idea being that the prescribed administrative agency
will be better equipped to resolve the issue.142
The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine, like the
Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, is founded upon strong prudential
considerations.143  The prudential factors that support the
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine's existence are,
as classically stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:
First, and most important, the legislature creates an agency
for the purpose of applying a statutory scheme to particular
factual situations. The exhaustion doctrine permits the
agency to perform this function, including in particular the
opportunity for the agency to find facts, to apply its
expertise, and to exercise the discretion granted it by the
legislature. Second, it is more efficient to permit the
administrative process to proceed uninterrupted and to
subject the results of the process to judicial review only at
the conclusion of the process than to permit judicial
intervention at each phase of the process. Third, agencies
are not part of the Judicial Branch; they are autonomous
entities created by the legislature to perform a particular
function. The exhaustion doctrine protects that agency
autonomy. Fourth, judicial review of agency action can be
hindered by failure to exhaust administrative remedies
because the agency may not have an adequate opportunity
to assemble and to analyze relevant facts and to explain the
basis for its action. Fifth, the exhaustion requirement
reduces court appeals by providing the agency additional
opportunities to correct its prior errors. Sixth, allowing
some parties to obtain court review without first exhausting
administrative remedies may reduce the agency's
effectiveness by encouraging others to circumvent its
procedures and by rendering the agency's enforcement
efforts more complicated and more expensive.
When compared with the prudential reasons supporting the
application of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine laid out by the
142. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 880 (3d ed. 1992).
143. See Gonzales v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227, 1233-34 (9th
Cir. 2007) (referring to prudential concerns and the application of the doctrine).
144. 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 15.2, at 309 (3d ed. 1994) (emphasis added) (citing McKart v.
United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969)).
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Supreme Court in National,145 the similarities between the
doctrines become readily apparent. Each doctrine recognizes that
another judicial institution's expertise is not only essential to
gathering the facts necessary for an adequate disposition of the
case at hand but also in applying the law to certain types of
disputes.146 Each recognizes that there is a potential for
jurisdictional nightmares in having judicial intervention at multiple
steps in the process.14 7 Each doctrine exists in order to protect the
autonomy of another judicial body.148 Each also places emphasis
on the importance of the subservient judicial body's ability to
explain the bases for a decision.149 Lastly, each doctrine exists out
of recognition that a district court's premature decision of a case
could reduce the other judicial body's effectiveness.' The
prudential concerns that exist to support the Tribal Exhaustion
Doctrine are clearly similar to those that support the Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies Doctrine. As such, the doctrines should
be applied in similar fashion. 151
Courts apply the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Doctrine because they consider administrative agencies as experts
in their particular field. It is, therefore, important to illustrate how
tribal courts are experts in answering questions related to their own
jurisdiction. The determination of whether tribal courts will have
jurisdiction requires the balancing of factors related to tribal self-
determination and tribal sovereignty.152 Tribal courts regularly
handle these questions,'53 and as a result, they have the most
expertise in determining whether control over certain activities on
tribal lands is essential to tribal self-government.154 Further, the
tribal courts have actually developed their own doctrine of
145. Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
856-57 (1985).
146. Id. at 857; 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 144, § 15.2.
147. National, 471 U.S. at 857; 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 144, § 15.2.
148. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987); 2 DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 144, § 15.2.
149. National, 471 U.S. at 857; see also 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 144,
§ 15.2.
150. Iowa, 480 U.S. at 15; see also 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 144, § 15.2.
151. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts' Jurisdictional
Determinations: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding, and Respect Between
Different Cultural and Judicial Norms, 24 N.M. L. REV. 191, 195 (1994).
152. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
153. See Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in
Tribal Courts and the Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An
Essay, 18 N.M. L. REV. 49 (1988).
154. Skibine, supra note 151, at 222.
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sovereign immunity under tribal law.' 55 Given that tribal courts are
essentially experts with respect to these issues, it becomes apparent
that questions of jurisdiction, such as those found in Meyer, should
be addressed by the tribal courts because they are the judicial
institutions that are most qualified to answer these questions.
C. Louisiana State Policies Regarding Native American Tribes
Also Indicate That the Doctrine Should Have Been Required
In reaching its decisions in National and in Iowa, the U.S.
Supreme Court based its holdings on the existence of a strong
federal policy in favor of tribal sovereignty, self-determination,
and self-government.' 56 Although there is not much room for state
legislation with respect to Native Americans because Congress
retains plenary power over the tribes,' 57 there are a few areas in
which Louisiana has passed legislation governing interactions with
Native American tribes.15 8 Within these statutes, there appears to
be some basis to conclude that Louisiana's policy is to promote
those same goals that the federal government wishes to promote. A
few statutes directly require that Native American tribes be treated
as though they are sister states.159 Much more directly, however,
one statute says that "[i]t is the policy of this state to acknowledge
the tribes within the borders of the state, to support their
aspirations for the preservation of their cultural heritage and the
155. Rave v. Reynolds, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6150, 6161 (Winnebago Tribe of
Neb. Sup. Ct. 1996).
156. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) ("We have
repeatedly recognized the Federal Government's longstanding policy of
encouraging tribal self-government."); Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985) ("Our cases have often recognized
that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and
self-determination.").
157. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978) ("Congress has
plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters, including their
form of government.").
158. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8:681 (Supp. 2011) (instructing
agencies on how to proceed when an unmarked grave contains a person of
Native American descent); id. § 13:1804(B) (denoting how Native American
tribes are to be treated for purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act); id. § 1852(8) (denoting how Native American tribes are
to be treated for purposes of the Uniform International Child Abduction
Prevention Act); id. § 15:1423 (2005) (defining Native Americans as a minority
for purposes of the Juvenile Delinquency and Gang Prevention Act of 1993).
159. Id. § 13:1804(B) (Supp. 2011) ("A court of this state shall treat a tribe
as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying Subparts A
and B of this Part."); id. § 1852(8) ("State means a state of the United States
.... The term includes a federally recognized Indian tribe or nation.").
2011] NOTE 1359
0LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
improvement of their economic conditions, and to assist them in
achieving their just rights." 60 Moreover, a bill introduced in the
Louisiana Legislature in 2009 says that Louisiana's Office of
Indian Affairs "[a]ssists Louisiana American Indians in receiving
education, realizing self-determination, improving the quality of
life, and developing a mutual relationship between the state and the
Tribes."'61 It also appears that the Louisiana Legislature is
considering passing a law that would grant recognition of full faith
and comity to the judgments of Native American tribal courts, and
it has directed the Louisiana State Law Institute to study the
potential effects of such a law. 162 Therefore, it appears that
Louisiana's policy regarding Native Americans also echoes that of
the federal government.
Because Native American tribes are immune from suit unless
they have waived their sovereign immunityl 63 and the question of
waiver is ultimately one of tribal law, tribal courts are entitled to
answer that very question. Because tribal law is different from
typical American law, district courts are ill equipped to apply tribal
law. Further, given that tribal courts are experts at determining
questions of tribal sovereign immunity and jurisdiction, deference
should be given to that expertise in much the same way that
administrative agencies are treated under the Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies Doctrine. Such a result would not only
further the policies of the federal government, but would further
Louisiana's policies as well.
D. The Other Side of the Coin: A Contemplation ofPolicy
Considerations Against Exhaustion
One unfortunate side effect of the application of the Tribal
Exhaustion Doctrine is that requiring the tribal court to determine
whether it has jurisdiction may delay the ultimate resolution of a
litigant's claim. Although in a vacuum this may seem like an
unjustifiable run-around, a comparison to the effects of the
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine shows that, in
reality, the application of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine is far less
egregious.
One commentator characterized a potential scenario in which a
litigant must exhaust all available administrative remedies in order
160. Id. § 49:158.1(2) (2003).
161. H.B. 1, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2009).
162. S. Con. Res. 125, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006).
163. See generally Bonnette v. Tunica-Biloxi Indians, 873 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct.
App. 3d 2003).
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to receive judicial relief from an adverse decision from an
administrative agency:
First, the person appeals the initial denial decision to the
supervisor of the clerk who processed the application and
determined that it did not qualify for the benefit (or tax
exemption). Most often, the supervisor will support the
position of the clerk. Next, an appeal can be made to the
supervisor's supervisor, who most likely will be the director
of the local office. If the person loses that appeal, he or she
must appeal the decision to the local director to the regional
office. If the decision from the regional office is still adverse,
some agencies require (allow) an appeal to the head of the
agency for a final agency decision, which can then (and only
then) be challenged in the courts. That is exhaustion, and
under normal circumstances a federal court will simply not
entertain a suit by a plaintiff who has not exhausted all
avenues of appeal available within the agency.164
By comparison, the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, even held
against the negative characterization used by the court in Meyer,165
would appear to be far less burdensome on a litigant's claim.
Another potential concern is that a litigant's case could be taken
out of a state's court and placed into the tribal court, a potentially
unfamiliar and unexpected venue. Although the fear of being
"home-towned" is certainly a valid one, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Iowa rejected this argument.1 66 This rejection makes sense in light
of the fact that a litigant whose claim has been subjected to the
exhaustion requirement will have a right to review in federal district
court once all of the remedies have been exhausted.167
Although it is apparent that the application of the Tribal
Exhaustion Doctrine will, in some instances, result in delay and
expense to a litigant, these concerns are outweighed by the policy
considerations made in favor of its application. 168 Requiring the
Doctrine in Louisiana's courts would therefore serve the best
interests of the state as well as those of the Native American tribes
within its borders.
164. CANN, supra note 141, at 117.
165. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
166. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1987) ("Petitioner
also contends that the policies underlying the grant of diversity jurisidiction ...
justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case. We have rejected similar
attacks on tribal court jurisdiction in the past.... The alleged incompetence of
tribal courts is not among the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement.").
167. Id. at 19.
168. See discussion supra Part IV.A-C.
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CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether the decision to do so is based on a
substantive requirement or prudential considerations in favor of
tribal sovereignty and self-determination, the Louisiana Supreme
Court erred by not requiring the application of the Tribal
Exhaustion Doctrine in Louisiana's district courts. Given that tribal
culture and experience is different from that found in American
societies, conflicts in the creation, application, and enforcement of
laws are bound to arise between tribes and federal or state
institutions.169 However, an essential component of maintaining
and promoting tribal sovereignty is an acceptance of these
differences. 170 Therefore, in recognition of these differences and
out of respect to these "domestic dependent nations," Louisiana
courts should be required to defer to tribal courts for
determinations of their own jurisdiction.
Carey Austin Holliday*
169. See Pommersheim & Marshall, supra note 124, at 421.
170. See id. at 420 ("Tribal courts do not exist solely to reproduce or
replicate the dominant canon appearing in state and federal courts. If they did,
the process of colonization would be complete and the unique legal cultures of
the tribes fully extirpated.").
* The author would like to thank Professor John Devlin and Keith
Fernandez for their help and constructive criticism throughout this process. The
author would also like to thank his lovely wife, Amanda, for her support and for
the fact that she only mildly protested at being forced to read this "boring
paper." Lastly, the author also wishes to thank his family for the love and
support they have provided throughout his life.
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